






Safety systems and thermal runaway in lithium ion batteries

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Large lithium-ion batteries









Large lithium-ion batteries

Lithium ion Battery Energy Storage Systems LiBESS

Grid-scale LiBESS

Domestic LiBESS (DLiBESS)

Commercial




2 kWh \rightarrow 130 kWh or more (Tesla S 100 kWh)

UK absolutely NO regulations

DIY




??kWh





 $1MWh \rightarrow 1000$'s MWh

Thermal runaway



A key factor with respect to the stability lithium ion batteries, and hence thermal runaway, appears to be the composition of the cathode:

LCO 130°C

NMC 240°C

LMO 270°C

LFP 310°C

Tesla is launching a new LFP battery option for the Model 3 in the United States.

Thermal runaway should be prevented by a number of safety systems:

The Solid Electrolyte Interface

The Battery Management System (BMS)

Physical safety systems

- Safety vents
- Temperature cut-off (TCO) circuitry (part of the BMS)
- Positive temperature coefficient (PTC) thermistors
- Shutdown separators

Chemical additives

System-level safety

- Thermal barriers
- Cooling

The Battery Management System

The BMS:

Ensures safe operation

Facilitate longevity

Monitors state of function (current [charge passed] and voltage)

- State-of-Charge, SoC
- · State-of-Health, SoH

Alerts for e.g.

- High temperature
- Cell imbalance
- To indicate End-of-Life

Prevents overcharge and overdischarge

The sophistication and functionality of the BMS depends strongly upon the application

But: lithium-ion batteries still fail, sometimes catastrophically.

Most safety systems are targeted at cutting the flow of electrons or ions, or disconnecting from the mains.

By the time this occurs it is too late and the cell is in thermal runaway.

Thermal runaway and the vapour cloud

Thermal runaway → gases+heat → gases vent → white vapour cloud

Immediate ignition

Flare-like flames, thin fume

Cathode material ejected as black "smoke" of heavy metal nanoparticles

Delayed ignition

Toxic cloud Vapor Cloud Explosion

Remaining plastics burn with black smoky fume

What happens when the BMS fails.....immediate ignition....



Experiment No. 7

Date: 22/01/2020





Delayed ignition



Nail penetration of an 8 54Ah cell module, mimicking delayed ignition and build-up of vapour cloud: container fills from roof down.

If the vapour cloud does not ignite immediately.... different chemistry and form factor



Container fills from floor upwards.....LEL 6-11%





Hyundai Kona, January 2021

Vapour Cloud Explosions due to lithium-ion batteries have involved EVs, submarines, marine vessels, aircraft and domestic & industrial battery energy storage systems.

Thankyou for your kind attention

Over to Tony and a Firefighter's perspective

Battery Energy Storage
Fires – A disaster
waiting to happen?
Future Intervention
models

Tony McGuirk MSc. FIFireE





Challenges will increase





The number of "unknown" **Volume** BESS systems will increase exponentially.



Safe firefighting requires a different intervention model



New skills needed to handle accidents and to ensure the safety of themselves and others.

Risk

BESS systems present new risks and it is obvious this requires new skills, techniques and technologies

The shift to alternative power vehicles leads to new risk – no consistency on "best practice"



Need for new skills, new training and new response technology



Successful conclusion will not be quick and/or slick



New infrastructure with limited regulation





New techniques, training and equipment will require investment and cost

Key Questions and answers for Fire Services and other agencies



01



- ✓ Do we understand the full picture of how these systems will behave in a variety of fire scenarios? NO
- ✓ Do Firefighters and officers in charge have the requisite knowledge and training to understand the problem with a BESS container fire? NO

02



- ✓ Do we undertand the environmental pathways of contamination? YES
- ✓ Do we understand the need for an integrated model? NO
- ✓ Do we understand how the technology will behave in a fire or thermal runaway? Not fully.

03



First responders need to be aware of additional risks – electrocution, arc flash explosion, vapour cloud explosion, highly toxic fumes

Engineered Intervention Models

Contain the fire by limiting oxygen supply to the fire, but especially to the lithium batteries.

Contain

Smart use of water to achieve maximum cooling whilst minimising contaminated and toxic water run-off.

Cool

First responders will need to develop Control new techniques such as the use of thermal monitoring

Conclusion

BESS fires will not be resolved quickly, easily or cheaply –how will the waste industry respond?



What do we know?

- Early detection through data and hardware its your problem! Every wants to talk about prevention its currently impossible.
- Plan for failure its inevitable firefighters will not take risks for a few second-hand batteries in shipping containers!
- Regulations will catch up and existing regulations already put the legal obligation on the "responsible person"
- Plan for reality long duration, no risks taken, problem

Key takeaways - Plan (and insure) for reality .

- Planning assumptions for the fire service response must not be overly optimistic or ambitious.
- Operational planning procedures for failure, response and recovery are vital.
- Credible fire risk assessment must include fire fighting expertise, and not just fire engineers.
- BESS incidents will be highly visible

Final thought – it's a small world and emergency services talk!





Battery Energy Storage
Fires – A disaster waiting
to happen?
Future Intervention
models


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





THE GLOBAL BESS MARKET REVENUE SET TO GROW FROM \$24BN (2020) TO \$55BN (2025) WITH GW GROWING FROM 11GW (2020) TO 27GW (2025)

















NEW DISRUPTOR OWNERS

CONTRACTOR EXPERIENCE

STEEP LEARNING CURVES

REDUCING COSTS

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS — FIRE IS THE OUTCOME



Thermal

Mechanical

Chemical

Explosion

Electrical

Fire

EM Fields

Unsuitable working conditions

NatCat

EPC contractors knowledge and experience

Grid





NFPA 855 (2020)

UL 9540A

FM DATA SHEET 5-33

IEC


OTHER NATIONAL STANDARDS

ALL STILL IN DEVELOPMENT

















ERP

AGING – C RATE, CYCLING



